Are rules-based goverment programs shielded from special interest politics? : evidence from revenue-sharing transfers in Brazil
Year of publication: |
2012
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Authors: | Litschig, Stephan |
Published in: |
Journal of public economics. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0047-2727, ZDB-ID 183995-0. - Vol. 96.2012, 11/12, p. 1047-1060
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Subject: | Bureaucracy | Institutions | Redistributive politics | Electoral competition | Brasilien | Brazil | Wahlverhalten | Voting behaviour | Umverteilung | Redistribution | Interessenpolitik | Lobbying | Bürokratie | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice |
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