Are Self-regarding Subjects More Strategic?

To investigate the relationship between the depth of strategic thinking and social preferences we ask subjects in an experiment to perform dictator games and a guessing game. The guessing game measures depth of strategic thinking while dictator games control for social preferences. When performing a comparison within the same degree of strategic reasoning, self-regarding subjects show more strategic sophistication than other subjects.

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Year of publication:	2012
Authors:	Arruñada, Benito ; Casari, Marco ; Pancotto, Francesca
Publisher:	Bologna : Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)

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Series:	Quaderni - Working Paper DSE ; 805
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4213 [DOI] 899010369 [GVK] hdl:10419/159644 [Handle] RePEc:bol:bodewp:WP805 [RePEc]
Classification:	C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior ; C92 - Laboratory; Group Behavior ; D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011651697