Are we better off if our politicians know how the economy works?
Year of publication: |
1997
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Authors: | Lagerlöf, Johan |
Published in: |
Essays on political economy, information, and welfare. - Stockholm : Economic Research Inst., ISBN 91-7258-465-3. - 1997, p. 0
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Subject: | Interessenpolitik | Lobbying | Informationsökonomik | Economics of information | Wohlfahrtsökonomik | Welfare economics | Theorie | Theory |
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