Arrovian Social Choice Theory on Economic Domains

This article surveys the literature that investigates the consistency of Arrow's social choice axioms when his unrestricted domain assumptions are replaced by domain conditions that incorporate the restrictions on agendas and preferences encountered in economic environments. Both social welfare functions and social choice correspondences are considered.

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Year of publication:	2002-04
Authors:	Breton, Michel Le ; Weymark, John A.
Institutions:	Vanderbilt University Department of Economics
Subject:	Social choice \| Arrow's Theorem \| restricted domains

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Number 0206
Classification:	D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005595941