Arrow's impossibility theorem: Preference diversity in a single-profile world

In this paper we provide a simple new version of Arrow’s impossibility theorem, in a world with only one preference profile. This theorem relies on a new assumption of preference diversity, and we explore alternative notions of preference diversity at length.

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Year of publication:	2007
Authors:	Feldman, Allan M. ; Serrano, Roberto
Publisher:	Providence, RI : Brown University, Department of Economics
Subject:	Unmöglichkeitstheorem \| Theorie \| Arrow’s theorem \| single-profile \| preference diversity

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Series:	Working Paper ; 2007-12
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	541602306 [GVK] hdl:10419/80207 [Handle]
Classification:	D60 - Welfare Economics. General ; D70 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making. General ; D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318976