Assessing China's exchange rate regime
"The IMF Articles of Agreement forbid a country from manipulating its currency for unfair advantage. The US Treasury has been legally required since 1988 to report to Congress biannually regarding whether individual trading partners are guilty of manipulation. One part of this paper tests econometrically two competing sets of hypothesized determinants of the Treasury decisions: (1) legitimate economic variables consistent with the IMF definition of manipulation - the partners' overall current account/GDP, its reserve changes and the real overvaluation of its currency, and (2) variables suggestive of domestic American political expediency - the bilateral trade balance, US unemployment and an election year dummy. The econometric results suggest that the Treasury verdicts are driven heavily by the US bilateral deficit, though other variables also turn out to be quite important." Copyright (c) CEPR, CES, MSH, 2007.
Year of publication: |
2007
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Authors: | Frankel, Jeffrey A. ; Wei, Shang-Jin |
Published in: |
Economic Policy. - Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR). - Vol. 22.2007, 07, p. 575-627
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Publisher: |
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) Center for Economic Studies (CES) Paris-Jourdan Sciences Économiques (PSE) |
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