Assessing success and decisiveness in voting situations
In this paper we propose a simple model for measuring ‘success’ or ‘decisiveness’ in voting situations. For an assessment of these features two inputs are claimed to be necessary: the voting rule and the voters’ behavior. The voting rule specifies when a proposal is to be accepted or rejected depending on the resulting vote configuration. Voting behavior is summarized by a distribution of probability over the vote configurations. This basic model provides a clear common conceptual basis for reinterpreting different power indices and some related game theoretic notions coherently from a unified point of view. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2005
Year of publication: |
2005
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Authors: | Laruelle, Annick ; Valenciano, Federico |
Published in: |
Social Choice and Welfare. - Springer. - Vol. 24.2005, 1, p. 171-197
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Publisher: |
Springer |
Saved in:
Online Resource
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