Assessing the extent of democratic failures. A 99%-Condorcet’s Jury Theorem
This This paper determines the probability a large electorate will take take the correct decision under qualified majority rules. The model allows the competence of each elector to vary with the size of the electorate, thus the results represent a connection between "naive" and "strategic" Condorcet's Jury Theorems. JEL Classification: D72 · H11 · P16. Key words: Condorcet’s Jury theorem, probability of success, naive-strategic connection.
Year of publication: |
2014
|
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Authors: | Triossi, Matteo |
Institutions: | Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile |
Saved in:
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