Assessment of Collusion Damages in First Price Auctions
Year of publication: |
2020
|
---|---|
Authors: | Gabrielli, M. Florencia |
Other Persons: | Willington, Manuel (contributor) |
Publisher: |
[2020]: [S.l.] : SSRN |
Subject: | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Wettbewerbsbeschränkung | Restraints of competition | Kartell | Cartel |
Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource (37 p) |
---|---|
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments May 17, 2020 erstellt |
Other identifiers: | 10.2139/ssrn.3388324 [DOI] |
Classification: | c57 ; D44 - Auctions ; L40 - Antitrust Policy. General |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
-
Collusive communication schemes in a first-price auction
Āzacis, Helmuts, (2012)
-
Collusion in multiobject auctions : an experimental evidence
Matousek, Jindrich, (2015)
-
Do pay-as-bid auctions favor collusion? : evidence from Germany’s market for reserve power
Heim, Sven, (2013)
- More ...
-
Aryal, Gaurab, (2021)
-
Can Transparency Increase Adverse Selection? Evidence from an Electronic Platform for Annuities
Gabrielli, M. Florencia, (2022)
-
Can transparency increase adverse selection? : evidence from an electronic platform for annuities
Fajnzylber, Eduardo, (2023)
- More ...