Assigning powers in the European Union in the light of yardstick competition among governments.

Intergovernmental yardstick competition is based on voters comparing the performance of their own elected government with what obtains in other jurisdictions. This mechanism can produce results that are favourable to voters but it may also be the case that it has consequences that are not favourable. Both cases are given some attention in the essay. Some of their implications for the assignment of powers in the European Union are then derived.

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Year of publication:	2003-01
Authors:	SALMON, Pierre
Institutions:	Laboratoire d'Économie de Dijon (LEDI), Université de Bourgogne

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Series:	LEG - Document de travail - Economie. - ISSN 1260-8556.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Number 2003-03 26 pages
Classification:	D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior ; H73 - Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005579077