Assigning Refugees to Landlords in Sweden: Efficient Stable Maximum Matchings
Year of publication: |
2016
|
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Authors: | Andersson, Tommy ; Ehlers, Lars |
Publisher: |
Lund : Lund University, School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics |
Subject: | refugees | forced migration | housing markets | market design | efficient stable maximum matchings |
Series: | Working Paper ; 2016:18 |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | hdl:10419/260190 [Handle] RePEc:hhs:lunewp:2016_018 [RePEc] |
Classification: | C71 - Cooperative Games ; C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations ; D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation ; F22 - International Migration |
Source: |
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Andersson, Tommy, (2018)
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Assigning refugees to landlords in Sweden : stable maximum matchings
Andersson, Tommy, (2016)
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A theory of school choice lotteries
Kesten, Onur, (2015)
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Transferring ownership of public housing to existing tenants: A mechanism design approach
Andersson, Tommy, (2015)
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Budget-balance, fairness and minimal manipulability
Ehlers, Lars, (2014)
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Assigning Refugees to Landlords in Sweden : Efficient, Stable, and Maximum Matchings*
Andersson, Tommy, (2019)
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