Assignment markets with the same core

In the framework of bilateral assignment games, we study the set of matrices associated with assignment markets with the same core. We state conditions on matrix entries that ensure that the related assignment games have the same core. We prove that the set of matrices leading to the same core form a join-semilattice with a finite number of minimal elements and a unique maximum. We provide a characterization of the minimal elements. A sufficient condition under which the join-semilattice reduces to a lattice is also given.

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Year of publication:	2011
Authors:	Martínez-de-Albéniz, F. Javier ; Núñez, Marina ; Rafels, Carles
Published in:	Games and Economic Behavior. - Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256. - Vol. 73.2011, 2, p. 553-563
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Assignment game \| Core \| Semilattice

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	C71 - Cooperative Games
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049744