Assignment Models and Reneging

We consider a non-cooperative assignment model where we show that any subgame perfect equilibrium is stable, and that an appropriate refinement criterion leads to the p-optimal outcome. We then consider a model with reneging and derive some interesting properties of this game. We show that in this case 'unraveling' may occur. Furthermore, the resulting outcome can be either stable, or unstable

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Year of publication:	2000
Authors:	Chowdhury, Prabal Roy
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Verhandlungstheorie \| Bargaining theory \| Nichtkooperatives Spiel \| Noncooperative game
Description of contents:	Abstract [papers.ssrn.com]

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	In: Economic Theory, Vol. 14, No. 2, August 1999 Volltext nicht verfügbar
Classification:	C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014184263