Assortative Matching in a Non-transferable World

Progress in the application of matching models to environments in which the utility between matching partners is not fully transferable has been hindered by a lack of characterization results analogous to those that are known for transferable utility. We present sufficient conditions for matching to be monotone that are simple to express and easy to verify. We illustrate their application with some examples that are of independent interest.

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Year of publication:	2002-07
Authors:	Legros, Patrick ; Newman, Andrew
Institutions:	C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
Subject:	assortative matching \| contract theory \| principal agent

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	CEPR Discussion Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Number 3469
Classification:	D51 - Exchange and Production Economies ; I22 - Educational Finance ; J41 - Contracts: Specific Human Capital, Matching Models, Efficiency Wage Models, and Internal Labor Markets
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504313