Assurance maladie et risque moral ex ante. L'incidence du type de risque sanitaire

This paper investigates the impact of health risk on insurance contract with hazard moral. We use a bi-dimensional utility function (wealth and health status). We prove that the type of health risk influences the equilibrium of insurance market. A full coverage is possible with moral hazard. Finally, the link between health risk and co-payment can be invalided.Classification JEL : D8, I1

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Year of publication:	2004
Authors:	Bien, Franck
Published in:	Revue économique. - Presses de Sciences-Po. - Vol. 55.2004, 3, p. 479-488
Publisher:	Presses de Sciences-Po

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Extent:	application/pdf text/html
Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	D8 - Information and Uncertainty ; I1 - Health
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008578490