Assurance maladie et risque moral ex ante. L'incidence du type de risque sanitaire

This paper investigates the impact of health risk on insurance contract with hazard moral. We use a bi-dimensional utility function (wealth and health status). We prove that the type of health risk influences the equilibrium of insurance market. A full coverage is possible with moral hazard. Finally, the link between health risk and co-payment can be invalided.

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Year of publication:	2004-05
Authors:	Bien, Franck
Institutions:	Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX)
Subject:	Equilibrium \| Hazard \| Health Insurance \| Health \| Insurance \| Moral Hazard

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Series:	Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Published in Revue économique, 2004, Vol. 55, no. 3. pp. 479-488.Length: 9 pages
Classification:	I11 - Analysis of Health Care Markets ; G22 - Insurance; Insurance Companies ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010861615