Asymmetric all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations

I show that a unique equilibrium exists in an asymmetric two-player all-pay auction with a discrete signal structure, correlated signals, and interdependent valuations. The proof is constructive, and the construction can be implemented as a computer program and be used to derive comparative statics. I also characterize the set of equilibria when a reserve price is introduced.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2014
Authors:	Siegel, Ron
Published in:	Journal of Economic Theory. - Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531. - Vol. 153.2014, C, p. 684-702
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Contests \| All-pay \| Auctions \| Asymmetries \| Interdependent valuations \| Correlated signals

Online Resource

Check full text access |

More access options

Check Google Scholar

In libraries world-wide (WorldCat)

In German libraries (KVK)

subito order

I need help

More details

Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	D44 - Auctions ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010930796