Asymmetric auctions with resale: An experimental study
We study auctions with resale based on Hafalir and Krishna's (2008) [6] model. As predicted, weak bidders bid more with resale than without, so that average auction prices tend to increase. When the equilibrium calls for weak types to bid higher than their values with resale they do, but not nearly as much as the theory predicts. In other treatments outcomes are much closer to the risk neutral Nash model's predictions. Bid distributions for weak and strong types are more similar with resale than without, in line with the theory.
Year of publication: |
2011
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Authors: | Georganas, Sotiris ; Kagel, John |
Published in: |
Journal of Economic Theory. - Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531. - Vol. 146.2011, 1, p. 359-371
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Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Subject: | Auctions Resale Experiment |
Saved in:
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