Asymmetric benchmarking in compensation : executives are rewarded for good luck but not penalized for bad
Year of publication: |
2006
|
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Authors: | Garvey, Gerald ; Milbourn, Todd |
Published in: |
Journal of financial economics. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0304-405X, ZDB-ID 187118-3. - Vol. 82.2006, 1, p. 197-225
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Subject: | Vergütungssystem | Compensation system | Führungskräfte | Managers | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Benchmarking | Aktienmarkt | Stock market | USA | United States |
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