Asymmetric discouragement in asymmetric contests

Christoph March, Marco Sahm

We provide new experimental evidence which suggests an asymmetric discouragement effect in lottery contests with heterogeneous abilities. Compared to a symmetric contest, subjects invest less effort when facing a stronger opponent, but they invest the same when facing a weaker opponent. Our results can be explained by a simple model of disappointment aversion.

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Year of publication:	September 2016
Authors:	March, Christoph ; Sahm, Marco
Publisher:	Munich : CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute
Subject:	asymmetric contest \| discouragement effect \| disappointment aversion \| laboratory experiment \| Experiment \| Wettbewerb \| Competition \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory \| Asymmetrische Information \| Asymmetric information

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (circa 11 Seiten) Illustrationen
Series:	CESifo working papers. - München : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ISSN 2364-1428, ZDB-ID 2065232-X. - Vol. no. 6108
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper ; Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/147362 [Handle]
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C92 - Laboratory; Group Behavior ; D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011544119