Asymmetric Information and Inefficient Regulation of Firms Under the Threat of Revolution
Year of publication: |
2012
|
---|---|
Authors: | Maarek, Paul ; Dorsch, Michael ; Dunz, Karl |
Institutions: | Théorie Économique, Modélisation, Application (THEMA), Université de Cergy-Pontoise |
Subject: | Political transition | Revolution | Asymmetric information | Perfect Bayesian equilibrium |
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