Asymmetric information and pooling contracts in hospital sector
Year of publication: |
2014
|
---|---|
Authors: | Mougeot, Michel ; Naegelen, Florence |
Institutions: | Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX) |
Subject: | Hospital regulation | patient severity | non-responsiveness | altruism | adverse selection |
Extent: | application/pdf |
---|---|
Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Notes: | Published in JITE : Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 2014, Vol. 170, no. 2. pp. 365-386.Length: 21 pages |
Classification: | I1 - Health ; L3 - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise ; D8 - Information and Uncertainty |
Source: |
-
Can Consumers Detect Lemons? Information Asymmetry in the Market for Child Care
Mocan, Naci H., (2001)
-
Power of incentives with motivated agents in public organizations.
Naegelen, Florence, (2011)
-
Power of incentives with motivated agents in public organizations
Naegelen, Florence, (2011)
- More ...
-
Power of incentives with motivated agents in public organizations
Naegelen, Florence, (2011)
-
Malédiction du vainqueur et rationalité économique
Naegelen, Florence, (1991)
-
Duopole de Bertrand, asymétrie d'information et bien-être collectif
Naegelen, Florence, (1991)
- More ...