Asymmetric Information in Public Provision Mechanisms

An optimal mechanism fot the provision of impure public inputs to oligopolistic firms is investigated using a three stage game where in the first stage the public agency which provides the public input fixes a non-linear price schedule.

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Year of publication:	1989
Authors:	Fiorentini, Gianluca
Publisher:	Bologna : Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)

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Series:	Quaderni - Working Paper DSE ; 77
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	10.6092/unibo/amsacta/5333 [DOI] hdl:10419/158920 [Handle] RePEc:bol:bodewp:77 [RePEc]
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011650946