Asymmetric information may protect the commons: The welfare benefits of uninformed regulators

We examine an entry-deterrence model in the commons. We investigate in which contexts asymmetric information among firms becomes welfare improving, and in which settings an uninformed regulator may prefer to assess and disseminate information about the available stock among firms.

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Year of publication:	2013
Authors:	Espínola-Arredondo, Ana ; Muñoz-García, Félix
Published in:	Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 121.2013, 3, p. 463-467
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Entry deterrence \| Signaling \| Commons \| Welfare

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	D62 - Externalities ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; L12 - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies ; Q5 - Environmental Economics
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011041645