Asymmetric information renders minimum wages less harmful

We show that a minimum wage introduced in the presence of asymmetric information about worker productivities will lead to lower unemployment levels than predicted by the standard labour market model with heterogeneous labour and symmetric information.

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Year of publication:	2009
Authors:	Schöb, Ronnie ; Thum, Marcel
Publisher:	Munich : Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Subject:	Mindestlohn \| Wirtschaftspolitische Wirkungsanalyse \| Beschäftigungseffekt \| Asymmetrische Information \| Arbeitsproduktivität \| Theorie \| minimum wages \| unemployment \| asymmetric information \| labour market regulation

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Series:	CESifo Working Paper ; 2623
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	599570520 [GVK] hdl:10419/26668 [Handle]
Classification:	J2 - Time Allocation; Work Behavior; Employment Determination and Creation ; J3 - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs ; H5 - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies ; L5 - Regulation and Industrial Policy
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010264617