Asymmetric regulators in polluting mixed oligopolies : agency problems and second-mover advantage
Year of publication: |
2024
|
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Authors: | Strandholm, John C. ; Espinola-Arredondo, Ana ; Muñoz-García, Félix |
Published in: |
Journal of public economic theory. - Oxford : Wiley-Blackwell, ISSN 1467-9779, ZDB-ID 1478348-4. - Vol. 26.2024, 1, Art.-No. e12659, p. 1-27
|
Subject: | asymmetric regulators | emission fees | mixed oligopoly | privatization | Theorie | Theory | Oligopol | Oligopoly | Privatisierung | Privatization | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Regulierung | Regulation | Umweltpolitik | Environmental policy | Duopol | Duopoly |
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