At-will relationships : how an option to walk away affects cooperation and efficiency
Year of publication: |
March 2017
|
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Authors: | Wilson, Alistair J. ; Wu, Hong |
Published in: |
Games and economic behavior. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256, ZDB-ID 1002944-8. - Vol. 102.2017, p. 487-507
|
Subject: | Outside options | Endogenous termination | Dissolution clauses | Imperfect public monitoring | Dynamic games | Theorie | Theory | Dynamisches Spiel | Dynamic game | Unvollkommene Information | Incomplete information |
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