Attaching Workers Through In-kind Payments: Theory and Evidence from Russia
Year of publication: |
2005-03
|
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Authors: | Friebel, Guido ; Guriev, Sergei |
Institutions: | Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR), New Economic School (NES) |
Subject: | Labor market competition | Transition | Russia | Labor tying |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Notes: | Published in World Bank Economic Review, September 2005 Number w0057 36 pages |
Classification: | J42 - Monopsony; Segmented Labor Markets ; M42 - Auditing ; O15 - Human Resources; Income Distribution; Migration ; P31 - Socialist Enterprises and Their Transitions |
Source: |
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