Auction Design with Interdependent Valuations : The Generalized Revelation Principle, Efficiency, Full Surplus Extraction and Information Acquisition
Year of publication: |
2003
|
---|---|
Authors: | Mezzetti, Claudio |
Publisher: |
[S.l.] : SSRN |
Subject: | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Informationsversorgung | Information provision | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory |
Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource (52 p) |
---|---|
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments March 2003 erstellt |
Other identifiers: | 10.2139/ssrn.389541 [DOI] |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
-
Mechanism design with information acquisition
Bikhchandani, Sushil, (2017)
-
Consumer deliberation and product line design
Guo, Liang, (2012)
-
Mezzetti, Claudio, (2003)
- More ...
-
Sequential vs. Single-Round Uniform-Price Auctions
Mezzetti, Claudio, (2004)
-
Mezzetti, Claudio, (2003)
-
Mezzetti, Claudio, (2017)
- More ...