Auctions for social lending : a theoretical analysis
Year of publication: |
2014
|
---|---|
Authors: | Chen, Ning ; Ghosh, Arpita ; Lambert, Nicolas |
Published in: |
Games and economic behavior. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256, ZDB-ID 1002944-8. - Vol. 86.2014, p. 367-391
|
Subject: | Social lending | Peer-to-peer lending | Auctions | Mechanism design | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Kreditgeschäft | Bank lending | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Auktion | Auction | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information |
-
Auctions with imperfect commitment when the reserve may signal the auctioneer's type
Chŏn, Pyŏng-hŏn, (2013)
-
Auctions with dynamic costly information acquisition
Golrezaei, Negin, (2017)
-
Tell the truth or not? : the Montero mechanism for emissions control at work
Requate, Tilman, (2019)
- More ...
-
Auctions for social lending : a theoretical analysis
Chen, Ning, (2011)
-
Auctions for Social Lending: A Theoretical Analysis
Chen, Ning, (2011)
-
Auctions for social lending: A theoretical analysis
Chen, Ning, (2014)
- More ...