Auctions Set-Asides in a Vertically Differentiated Aftermarket
We study the optimal set-aside policy for an auction of a resource that is required to provide service in a vertically differentiated aftermarket. The regulator can choose either to set-aside a unit resource for entrants or to allow the incumbent to compete as well. We find that the highest quality firm may not always win the auction. When the resource is set aside, consumer welfare is highest for the moderate quality of the incumbent. Interestingly, we find that when additional resource enhances the quality of service provided by the incumbent, the optimal policy of the regulator is to set-aside the resource only for extreme values of the incumbent's initial quality
Year of publication: |
[2021]
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Authors: | Goyal, Achal |
Publisher: |
[S.l.] : SSRN |
Subject: | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Produktdifferenzierung | Product differentiation | Auktion | Auction | Vertikale Integration | Vertical integration | Produktqualität | Product quality | Duopol | Duopoly |
Description of contents: | Abstract [papers.ssrn.com] ; Abstract [doi.org] |
Saved in:
Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments March 29, 2020 erstellt Volltext nicht verfügbar |
Other identifiers: | 10.2139/ssrn.3563405 [DOI] |
Classification: | D44 - Auctions |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013324048
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