Auctions when bidders prepare by investing in ideas

Thomas Jeitschko; Elmar Wolfstetter

We consider auction games where, prior to the auction, bidders spend resources to increase to their valuations. The market game is solved by solving an equivalent auxiliary social choice problem, We show that standard auctions are fully efficient, whereas reserve price requirements entail a double ineffeciency. Moreover, we explain how optimal auctions differ from the well-known static optimum and sketch the impact of the information spillovers.

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Year of publication:	2000
Authors:	Jeitschko, Thomas D. ; Wolfstetter, Elmar
Publisher:	Munich : Univ., Center for Economic Studies
Subject:	Auktionstheorie \| Auction theory \| Öffentlicher Auftrag \| Public contract \| Forschungskosten \| Research expenditure \| Theorie \| Theory

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Extent:	7 S graph. Darst
Series:	CESifo working papers : the international platform of Ludwig-Maximilians University's Center for Economic Studies and the Ifo Institute. - Munich : CESifo, ISSN 1617-9595, ZDB-ID 2023380-2. - Vol. 258
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper ; Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature
Language:	English
Notes:	Auch im Internet unter der Adresse ftp://129.187.96.124/CESifo_WP/258.pdf verfügbar
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

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