Auctions Where Incomes are Private Information and Preferences (Non Quasi-Linear) are Common Knowledge
Year of publication: |
2010
|
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Authors: | Dastidar, Krishnendu Ghosh |
Publisher: |
[2010]: [S.l.] : SSRN |
Subject: | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Präferenztheorie | Theory of preferences | Einkommen | Income |
Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource (42 p) |
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Series: | ISER Discussion Paper ; No. 790 |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments September 22, 2010 erstellt |
Other identifiers: | 10.2139/ssrn.1680691 [DOI] |
Classification: | D44 - Auctions |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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