Auctions with almost homogeneous bidders
We prove that, around the symmetric case, where the values are identically distributed, the equilibrium of the first price auction is jointly differentiable with respect to general bidder-specific parameters of the value distributions. We show that the revenue equivalence between the first-price and the second-price auctions to the first-order in the size of the parameters is an immediate consequence of this differentiability and the Revenue Equivalence Theorem; thereby formally establishing the first-order equivalence Fibich et al. [G. Fibich, A. Gavious, A. Sela, Revenue equivalence in asymmetric auctions, J. Econ. Theory 115 (2004) 309-321] noticed for their particular perturbation.
Year of publication: |
2009
|
---|---|
Authors: | Lebrun, Bernard |
Published in: |
Journal of Economic Theory. - Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531. - Vol. 144.2009, 3, p. 1341-1351
|
Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Keywords: | Independent private value model Auctions Asymmetry First-price auction Second-price auction Differentiability Revenue Equivalence Theorem |
Saved in:
Online Resource
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
Uniqueness of the equilibrium in first-price auctions
Lebrun, Bernard, (2006)
-
First-price auctions with resale and with outcomes robust to bid disclosure
Lebrun, Bernard, (2010)
-
Auctions with almost homogeneous bidders
Lebrun, Bernard, (2009)
- More ...