Auctions with selective entry
Year of publication: |
September 2017
|
---|---|
Authors: | Gentry, Matthew ; Li, Tong ; Lu, Jingfeng |
Published in: |
Games and economic behavior. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256, ZDB-ID 1002944-8. - Vol. 105.2017, p. 104-111
|
Subject: | Auctions | Endogenous participation | Mechanism design | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie |
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