(Bad) reputation in relational contracting
Year of publication: |
2022
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Authors: | Deb, Rahul ; Mitchell, Matthew F. ; Pai, Mallesh M. |
Published in: |
Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in economic theory. - Toronto : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ISSN 1555-7561, ZDB-ID 2220447-7. - Vol. 17.2022, 2, p. 763-800
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Subject: | Expert advice | bad reputation | strategic experimentation | bandits | relational contracting | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Reputation | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Unvollständiger Vertrag | Incomplete contract | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Experiment | Experten | Experts |
Type of publication: | Article |
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Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 10.3982/TE4803 [DOI] hdl:10419/296370 [Handle] |
Classification: | D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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