Balance and discontinuities in infinite games with type-dependent strategies
Under study are games in which players receive private signals and then simultaneously choose actions from compact sets. Payoffs are measurable in signals and jointly continuous in actions. Stinchcombe (2011) [19] proves the existence of correlated equilibria for this class of games. This paper is a study of the information structures for these games, the discontinuous expected utility functions they give rise to, and the notion of a balanced approximation to an infinite game with discontinuous payoffs.
Year of publication: |
2011
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Authors: | Stinchcombe, Maxwell B. |
Published in: |
Journal of Economic Theory. - Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531. - Vol. 146.2011, 2, p. 656-671
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Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Keywords: | Infinite games Continuous informational commonalities Balanced approximations Prevalence Shyness |
Saved in:
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