Bank-appointed directors and idiosyncratic volatility : evidence from India
Year of publication: |
2022
|
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Authors: | Jadiyappa, Nemiraja ; Joseph, Anto ; Sisodia, Garima |
Published in: |
International journal of managerial finance : IJMF. - Bradford : Emerald, ISSN 1758-6569, ZDB-ID 2227388-8. - Vol. 18.2022, 2, p. 222-239
|
Subject: | Agency costs | Bank appointed directors | Bank governance | Creditors' governance | Idiosyncratic volatility | Moral hazard | Volatilität | Volatility | Indien | India | Corporate Governance | Corporate governance | Moral Hazard | Bank | Führungskräfte | Managers | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Vorstand | Executive board |
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