Bank insolvencies, regulatory forbearance and ambiguity

Dmitri V. Vinogradov

Banking regulators often practice forbearance and ambiguity in insolvency resolutions. The paper examines the effects of regulatory forbearance and ambiguity in a context of allocational efficiency. Bailouts, liquidations and their stochastic policy mix lead to suboptimal allocations if banks do not internalize insolvency costs. The policy of forbearance may make banks internalizing such costs and improves the efficiency of intermediation.

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Year of publication:	September 14, 2006 ; This version: September 14, 2006
Authors:	Vinogradov, Dmitri V.
Publisher:	Heidelberg : University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics
Subject:	Banks \| insolvency resolution \| forbearance \| constructive ambiguity \| Bankenregulierung \| Bank regulation \| Bankinsolvenz \| Bank failure \| Wirkungsanalyse \| Impact assessment \| Allokationseffizienz \| Allocative efficiency \| Theorie \| Theory

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (circa 28 Seiten) Illustrationen
Series:	Discussion paper series / University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics. - Heidelberg : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ZDB-ID 2217357-2. - Vol. no. 431
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Amtsdruckschrift ; Government document ; Statistik ; Statistics ; Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper ; Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature
Language:	English
Notes:	Systemvoraussetzungen: Acrobat Reader
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/127252 [Handle]
Classification:	D50 - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium. General ; E44 - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy ; G21 - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Mortgages ; G28 - Government Policy and Regulation
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003393906