Bank rescues and bailout expectations: The erosion of market discipline during the financial crisis
Year of publication: |
2013
|
---|---|
Authors: | Hett, Florian ; Schmidt, Alexander |
Institutions: | Research Center SAFE (Sustainable Architecture for Finance in Europe), House of Finance |
Subject: | Bailout | Implicit Guarantees | Too-Big-To-Fail | Market Discipline |
Extent: | application/pdf |
---|---|
Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Notes: | Number 36 |
Classification: | G14 - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies ; G21 - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Mortgages ; G28 - Government Policy and Regulation ; H81 - Governmental Loans, Loan Guarantees, and Credits |
Source: |
-
Bank Bailouts and Market Discipline: How Bailout Expectations Changed During the Financial Crisis
Hett, Florian, (2013)
-
Bank rescues and bailout expectations : the erosion of market discipline during the financial crisis
Hett, Florian, (2013)
-
Dumontaux, N., (2013)
- More ...
-
Systemic risk in the financial sector: What can se learn from option markets?
Kraft, Holger, (2013)
-
Bank Bailouts and Market Discipline: How Bailout Expectations Changed During the Financial Crisis
Hett, Florian, (2013)
-
Do Bank Bail-Outs cause Moral Hazard? Evidence from the Subprime Crisis
Hett, Florian, (2010)
- More ...