Banking market structure and bank intermediation strategies in emerging markets: three essays

This thesis focuses on bank market structure and the effect of changes to this structure on intermediation strategies using a dataset that covers many regions of the world. Employing different estimation techniques and methodologies, and using a novel approach to each line of research, this thesis provides the following robust results: first, increase banking competition weakens the effectiveness of monetary policy. This is because an increase in the degree of market power increases the response of bank lending to the monetary policy stance. Second, competition increases stability as banks diversify across and within their business activities. Third, the high net-interest margin and relatively low insolvency risk among banks in developing countries could be attributed to a high degree of market power and the use of internal capital financing. The thesis makes the following contributions to the literature: first, in order to gain new insights and provide new dimensions to the existing literature, each of the three core chapters employs an estimation strategy that is new in the literature and which offers more scope for investigation. For instance, the positive influence of revenue diversification on the competition-stability nexus is new in the literature. Second, this thesis is first in considering how various measures of market power and a variety of bank funding strategies impact on banks performance. Furthermore, considering the banking structure-risk-lending channel hypothesis in assessing banks’ response to monetary shocks is also new in the monetary policy transmission literature. In conclusion, this thesis gives rise to important public policy recommendations. First, the strong link between market imperfections and the effectiveness of monetary policy indicators requires regulation that can resolve and offset the adverse effects of further increases in the degree of bank market power on the effectiveness of monetary transmission. Second, given the results of the role of diversification on the competition-stability relationship, there is no evidence to support regulatory initiative that restricts banks diversification activities. The third and final recommendation is on the concept of market power: bank market power in itself is not detrimental to banking activities, but the level and the application of it could negatively affect bankinsolvency risk. Therefore, supervisory, regulatory and competition authorities should coordinate to put in place a comprehensive framework that allows banks to have a considerable amount of market power that is robust and consistent with any competition policy