Banking union with a sovereign virus
Despite the experience of the ongoing sovereign debt crisis, European banks continue to hold large amounts of bonds from their home governments. This ties the fates of the sovereign and the banks together, leading to the disruptive self-reinforcing feedback loops that brought the euro area to the brink of collapse. This article addresses how banks can be weaned off of their massive investments in their home government’s bonds. Copyright ZBW and Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013
Year of publication: |
2013
|
---|---|
Authors: | Gros, Daniel |
Published in: |
Intereconomics: Review of European Economic Policy. - Springer, ISSN 0020-5346. - Vol. 48.2013, 2, p. 93-97
|
Publisher: |
Springer |
Saved in:
Online Resource
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
Stabilization Policy with Bands
Gros, Daniel, (1990)
-
Ten years after: What is special about transition countries?
Gros, Daniel, (2000)
-
Meschede, Christine, (2018)
- More ...