Banks as Secret Keepers
Tri Vi Dang, Gary Gorton, Bengt Holmström, Guillermo Ordonez
Banks are optimally opaque institutions. They produce debt for use as a transaction medium (bank money), which requires that information about the backing assets - loans - not be revealed, so that bank money does not fluctuate in value, reducing the efficiency of trade. This need for opacity conflicts with the production of information about investment projects, needed for allocative efficiency. Intermediaries exist to hide such information, so banks select portfolios of information-insensitive assets. For the economy as a whole, firms endogenously separate into bank finance and capital market/stock market finance depending on the cost of producing information about their projects
Year of publication: |
June 2014
|
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Authors: | Dang, Tri Vi |
Other Persons: | Holmström, Bengt (contributor) ; Gorton, Gary (contributor) ; Ordonez, Guillermo (contributor) |
Institutions: | National Bureau of Economic Research (contributor) |
Publisher: |
Cambridge, Mass : National Bureau of Economic Research |
Subject: | Theorie | Theory | Bank | Kreditgeschäft | Bank lending | Fremdkapital | Debt financing | Geheimhaltung | Secrecy | Finanzintermediation | Financial intermediation | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Portfolio-Management | Portfolio selection | Eigenkapital | Equity capital | Kapitalstruktur | Capital structure | Börsengang | Initial public offering |
Saved in:
freely available
Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource |
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Series: | NBER working paper series ; no. w20255 |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | Mode of access: World Wide Web System requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers. |
Other identifiers: | 10.3386/w20255 [DOI] |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012458411