Bargaining and the joint-cost theory of strikes : an experimental study
Year of publication: |
1990
|
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Authors: | Sopher, Barry |
Published in: |
Journal of labor economics. - Chicago, Ill. : Univ. of Chicago Press, ISSN 0734-306X, ZDB-ID 875356-8. - Vol. 8.1990, 1, p. 48-74
|
Subject: | Verhandlungstheorie des Lohnes | Collective bargaining theory | Arbeitskampf | Industrial action | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Theorie | Theory |
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