Bargaining in the Shadow of the Market:Selected Papers on Bilateral and Multilateral Bargaining

<em>Bargaining in the Shadow of the Market ¡ª Selected Papers on Bilateral and Multilateral Bargaining</em> consists of selected research in bargaining carried out by Kalyan Chatterjee by himself and with various co-authors. Chatterjee has been one of the earliest researchers to work on noncooperative bargaining theory and has contributed to bilateral bargaining with parties having private information as well as multilateral coalition formation models. Some of his work in each of these areas finds place here. The main theme of this collection of papers is the nature of negotiations when participants have alternatives to continue negotiating, either by beginning negotiations with a different partner or set of partners or by engaging in time-consuming search for such partners. Chapters in this book include: a noncooperative theory of coalitional bargaining and features a laboratory experiment relevant to this theory as well as an extension to political negotiations, search for alternative partners, the effect of markets and bargaining on incentives of players to invest in the partnership and related papers on incentive compatibility, arbitration and a dynamic model of negotiation. The book also includes a new introduction that puts these papers in the context of the broader literature in the field.<strong>Contents:</strong> <ul> <li>Bilateral and Multilateral Bargaining: An Introduction</li> <li>Bargaining and Search with Incomplete Information about Outside Options</li> <li>Rubinstein Auctions: On Competition for Bargaining Partners</li> <li>Bargaining, Competition and Efficient Investment</li> <li>A Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining</li> <li>How Communication Links Influence Coalition Bargaining: A Laboratory Investigation</li> <li>Pre-electoral Coalitions and Post-election Bargaining</li> <li>Comparison of Arbitration Procedures: Models with Complete and Incomplete Information</li> <li>Incentive Compatibility in Bargaining Under Uncertainty</li> <li>Bargaining under Two-Sided Incomplete Information: The Unrestricted Offers Case</li> </ul> <br> <strong>Readership:</strong> Advanced economics undergraduates, graduate and research communities interested in the field of bargaining, micro-economic theory and game theory. <b>Key Features:</b> <ul> <li>Includes among the earliest papers on incentive compatible trades, two-sided incomplete information bargaining and arbitration with incomplete information</li> <li>Explores multilateral negotiations and coalition formation from different angles with a focus on outside options</li> <li>Explains open problems, new research directions and connections with other literature</li>