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Bargaining over an endogenous agenda
Year of publication: |
May 2014
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Authors: | Anesi, Vincent ; Seidmann, Daniel J. |
Published in: |
Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in economic theory. - Toronto : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ISSN 1555-7561, ZDB-ID 2220447-7. - Vol. 9.2014, 2, p. 445-482
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Subject: | Bargaining | committee voting | evolving default | stable set | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule | Verhandlungstheorie | Bargaining theory | Verhandlungen | Negotiations | USA | United States | Theorie | Theory |
Type of publication: | Article |
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Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 10.3982/TE1318 [DOI] hdl:10419/150228 [Handle] |
Classification: | C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations ; D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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