Bargaining Over Public Goods
In a simple public good economy, we propose a natural bargaining procedure whose equilibria converge to Lindahl allocations as the cost of bargaining vanishes. The procedure splits the decision over the allocation in a decision about personalized prices and a decision about output levels for the public good. Since this procedure does not assume price-taking behavior, it provides a strategic foundation for the personalized taxes inherent to the Lindahl solution to the public goods problem.
Year of publication: |
2009-01
|
---|---|
Authors: | Davila, Julio ; Eeckhout, Jan ; Martinelli, Cesar |
Institutions: | Centro de Investigación Económica (CIE), Departamento Académico de Economía |
Saved in:
freely available
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
Martinelli, Cesar, (2005)
-
A Bayesian Model of Voting in Juries
Duggan, John, (1999)
-
Voting in Cartels: Theory and Evidence from the Shipping Industry
Martinelli, Cesar, (2004)
- More ...