Bargaining Set and Anonymous Core without the Monotonicity Assumption

We give an example of an atomless exchange economy in which consumers'preference relations are not monotone and in which the bargaining set of Mas-Colell (1989) consists of all allocations satisfying resource constraints, although the set of all Walrasian equilibrium allocations, the core, and the anonymous core of Hara (2002) are all empty. We also give an equivalence theorem for the anonymous core when the preference relations may not be monotone.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2004-11
Authors:	Hara, Chiaki
Institutions:	Institute of Economic Research, Kyoto University
Subject:	Atomless exchange economies \| core \| bargaining set \| anonymous core \| equivalence theorems

freely available

Full text |

More access options

Check Google Scholar

In German libraries (KVK)

I need help

More details

Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	KIER Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Number 599 12 pages
Classification:	C62 - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium ; C71 - Cooperative Games ; D41 - Perfect Competition ; D51 - Exchange and Production Economies ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Q53 - Air Pollution; Water Pollution; Noise; Hazardous Waste; Solid Waste
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005570208