Bargaining Structures and Delay in Innovation.
It is sometimes argued that fears about the employment consequences of introducing new technology may lead unions to wish to delay innovations, and this may reduce incentives for a firm to carry out R&D. The authors explore these issues in a model of two countries that compete over both market share and R&D, and they restrict attention to cases where unions would wish to delay innovation. They show that allowing unions to bargain over the timing of innovation need not reduce the possibility of a firm successfully competing for R&D. However, simulations suggest that, for a particular model, allowing unions to delay innovation does not help a firm compete over R&D. Copyright 1988 by The editors of the Scandinavian Journal of Economics.
Year of publication: |
1988
|
---|---|
Authors: | Ulph, Alistair ; Ulph, David |
Published in: |
Scandinavian Journal of Economics. - Wiley Blackwell, ISSN 1467-9442. - Vol. 90.1988, 4, p. 475-91
|
Publisher: |
Wiley Blackwell |
Saved in:
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
Labour markets, bargaining and innovation
Ulph, Alistair, (1998)
-
Optimal Climate Change Policies When Governments Cannot Commit
Ulph, Alistair, (2009)
-
Climate change: environmental and technology policies in a strategic context
Ulph, Alistair, (2007)
- More ...