Bargaining under almost complete information
Year of publication: |
2023
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---|---|
Authors: | Basak, Deepal |
Published in: |
Journal of economic theory. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531, ZDB-ID 410539-4. - Vol. 214.2023, p. 1-46
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Subject: | Bargaining | Higher-order uncertainty | Public sentiment | Reputation | Verhandlungstheorie | Bargaining theory | Vollkommene Information | Complete information | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Verhandlungen | Negotiations | Informationsökonomik | Economics of information |
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